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Abstract
Motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, we develop a lever-
age theory of tying in two-sided markets. In the presence of the non-negative price
constraint, tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the constraint in the tied mar-
ket without inviting aggressive responses by the rival rm. We identify conditions
under which tying in two-sided markets is protable and explore its welfare impli-
cations. In addition, we show that our model can be applied more widely to any
markets in which sales to consumers in one market can generate additional revenues
that cannot be competed away due to non-negative price constraints.
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1 Introduction
We develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. We analyze incentives for a
monopolist to tie its monopolized product with products facing competition in two-sided
markets. We uncover a new channel through which a monopolistic rm in one market
can leverage its monopoly power to another competing market if the latter is two-sided
and derive its welfare implications.
Our analysis, motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, applies
when platforms in a two-sided market are constrained to set non-negative prices on the
consumer side.1 In two-sided markets the need for all sides of the market to engage
creates a chicken and eggproblem (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) in that members of each
group are willing to participate in the market only if they expect many members from the
other side to participate. The literature on two-sided markets has analyzed the optimal
pricing structure to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers and shows
that below-cost pricing naturally arises on one side in order to enhance participation
because the loss from the below-cost pricing can be recouped on the other side of the
market (see Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006)). When the marginal cost is
low as in digital markets, this implies that the optimal pricing strategy entails negative
prices. However, we can imagine situations in which negative prices may be impractical
due to adverse selection and opportunistic behaviors by consumers (Farrell and Gallini
(1988) and Amelio and Jullien, 2012).2
We show that tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the non-negative price con-
straint in the tied product market without inviting an aggressive response by the rival
rm if the rival rms price response to tying faces the non-negative constraint. In our
model, the non-negative price constraint plays two roles: 1) it limits competition in the
tied good market, which creates additional surplus to extract through tying, and 2) it lim-
its the rival rms response to tying. In addition, our theory lls the gap in the literature
by showing that tying is credible without any commitment mechanism and forecloses the
rival in the tied product market regardless of whether the two products tied together are
independent or complementary. The credibility of tying can explain the use of contractual
tying (such as Googles contract with handset manufacturers) for the leverage purpose.3
1For a discussion of how to apply antiturst law to zero-price markets, including the issues of market
denition and market power, from the legal perspective, see Newman (2015, 2016).
2To quote Farrell and Gallini (1988), "[a]t a negative price, people could take computers at a negative
price and use them for landll (p.679)."
3The tying literature distinguishes contractual tying from technical tying: the former can be undone
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To see the incentives to leverage monopoly power, consider a monopolist in one market
that also competes in a two-sided market with a more e¢ cient rival rm (i.e., a rival
platform). The two-sided market consists of consumers on one side and advertisers on
the other. We envision a situation in which consumers are competitive bottleneck in the
two-sided market (see Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007)); a platform
can extract extra revenues from the advertiser side when it attracts a consumer from the
bottleneck side. First, in the absence of tying, the non-negative price constraint limits
competition on the consumer side of the two-sided market and generates additional prot
for the more e¢ cient rival rm which cannot be competed away. This creates incentives for
the monopolistic rm to tie and e¤ectively engage in a negative price in order to capture
this extra surplus. Second, when the monopolistic rm tries to steal the additional prot
in the two-sided market, tying will induce a more aggressive response by the rival rm
as in Whinston (1990). However, the rival rms ability to respond aggressively can be
muted as the non-negative price constraint begins to bind. Thus, the non-negative price
constraint in two-sided markets plays the dual role of creating additional surplus and
limiting aggressive response by the rival rm, which provides incentives to tie by the
monopolistic rm.
The paper is motivated by major antitrust investigations in two-sided markets. For
instance, the European tying case against Microsoft (IP/04/382) in 2004 concerned Mi-
crosofts tying of its Windows Media Player (WMP) product with its dominant Windows
operating system, where the WMP market can be considered as a two-sided market.4
The recent antitrust investigations concerning Google in Europe and elsewhere also relate
to tying and vertical foreclosure issues in two-sided markets.5 In one of the investigations,
the European Commission (EC) is concerned with Googles conduct in relation to appli-
cations and services for smartphones and tablets.6 In particular, Google has been alleged
ex post with a relatively low cost while the latter can be undone only with a signicant cost. There-
fore, technical tying can be used as a device to pre-commit to tying when tying is not ex post credible
(Whinston, 1990).
4We provide more details on this case in section 2.4.1 To the extent that the web browser market is
two-sided, our model can also be applied to the Microsoft tying case in the US.
5Russian antitrust o¢ cials ned Google $6.8 million on August 11, 2016 for abusing its market position
with its mobile operating system Android. Google is also under investigation in Korea and India.
6The ECs other investigations on Google concern Googles search engine, which has been alleged to
bias its search results to promote other revenue-generating Google services such as comparison shop-
ping. See the European Commission Fact Sheet entitled "Antitrust: Commission sends Statement
of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service," released on April 15, 2015. Available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm
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by rival rms to "illegally hinder the development and market access of rival applications
and services by tying or bundling certain Google applications and services distributed on
Android devices with other Google applications, services and/or application programing
interfaces of Google."7 The tying mechanism we uncover can be applied to the Microsoft
WMP and the Google Android cases and can explain why Microsoft and Google have in-
centives to tie. We further show that such tying arrangements can lead to the exclusion of
(more e¢ cient) rival rms, providing a theory of harm associated with Microsofts WMP
tying and Googles practices in the MADA contracts.8
In section 2, we present our mechanism of tying in the baseline model of homogenous
consumers. In a setting in which the well-known "single monopoly prot result" holds if
the tied market is one-sided (or in the absence of the non-negative price constraint), we
show that the interplay between two-sidedness of the tied market and the non-negative
pricing constraint breaks the result and restores an incentive to tie to leverage monopoly
power into the tied two-sided market. In addition, this mechanism is robust even when the
bundled products are perfect complements instead of having independent values (section
2.2) and when consumers can multi-home (section 2.3). We also briey discuss how our
model can be applied to provide a theory of harm in the Microsoft WMP and the Google
Android cases (section 2.4). In particular, we show how we can modify the model to
be applied to the Google case because app developers can make payments to original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to have their apps to be pre-installed, which makes
the non-negative price assumption less applicable to OEMS.
In section 3, we show that our insight is not limited to two-sided markets and can
be more widely applied to any markets in which sales to consumers in one market can
generate additional revenues that cannot be competed away due to non-negative price
constraints. Specically, even if the tied market is one-sided, additional revenue can be
generated in an intertemporal context from the same market in the future in the presence
of network e¤ects (section 3.1) or switching costs (section 3.2).
In sections 4 and 5, we extend the baseline model by incorporating heterogenous
consumers in the tying market. This allows us to check the robustness of our insight
7See the European Commission Fact Sheet entitled "Antitrust: Commission opens formal investigation
against Google in relation to Android mobile operating system," released on April 15, 2015. Available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm
8For a detailed discussion of the key aspects of Googles practices and their potentially exclusionary
e¤ects in the mobile phone industry from a legal perspective, see Edelman and Geradin (2016) and Etro
and Ca¤arra (2017).
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obtained from the baseline model and also addresses the question of how the degree of
two-sidedness of the tying market a¤ects the incentive to tie.9 Sections 4 and 5 di¤er
in that we introduce intergroup network e¤ects in the tied market in section 5 while no
network e¤ect is introduced in section 4.
More specically, in section 4 we assume that consumers are bottleneck both in the
tying and in the tied two-sided markets. For example, the other side interacting with
consumers in both markets could be advertising. In such a case, we nd that the incentive
to tie increases with the degree of two-sidedness of the tied market but decreases with the
degree of two-sidedness of the tying market, where the two-sidedness is represented by the
importance of advertising revenues. For instance, when the tying market is su¢ ciently
two-sided while the tied market is close to being one-sided, tying reduces both rms
prots as in Whinston (1990). Under tying, consumers whose valuations for the monopoly
product are low enough prefer buying the competing tied product instead of the bundle.
This means that the tying rm loses the advertising revenue in the tying market from these
consumers. This loss increases with the degree of two-sidedness of the tying market. As
our model in section 4 includes tying in one-sided markets as a special case, it also captures
various motives for tying identied by the previous literature in one-sided markets.
Section 5 introduces cross-group network e¤ects in the tied market while maintaining
heterogenous consumers in the tying market. For instance, the other side in the tied mar-
ket could be applications. Consumersbenets increase with the number of applications
and application developersbenets increase with the number of consumers. When there
is no tying, the network e¤ects generate a tipping equilibrium toward the more e¢ cient
rival platform in the tied market. However, tying can generate a tipping toward the
tying platform and such tipping is more likely as the two-sidedness of the tying market
increases. Intuitively, when the tying market becomes more two-sided, the tying platform
becomes more aggressive in pricing in order to capture more consumers in the tying mar-
ket, which generates a larger network e¤ect and hence makes tipping more likely in the
tied market. When tipping occurs, there is no loss of advertising revenue in the tying
market and therefore the incentive to tie increases with the degree of two-sidedness of the
tying market. In addition, we show that this insight is robust to an interior equilibrium
in which the tying platform occupies a large consumer market share. We expect that a
similar insight can be applied to when the tying market (or both the tying and the tied
9In the baseline model of homogenous consumers, the incentive to tie does not depend on the degree
of two-sidedness of the tying market.
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markets) exhibits cross-group network e¤ects.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the leverage theory of tying, which has
been extensively studied. In a classical paper on tying, Whinston (1990) shows that
selling a monopolized primary product and an unrelated di¤erentiated product together
as a bundle may allow the monopolist to commit to a more aggressive pricing strategy,
preventing entry in the di¤erentiated market. In Carbajo, De Meza, and Seidman (1990),
on the other hand, bundling is used as a strategy to segment the market and relax price
competition.10 By considering a model in which each of the tying and the tied markets can
be one-sided or two-sided, our paper encompasses both Whinstons and Carbajo et al.s
results as special cases. In particular, when the tied market is two-sided, we uncover a new
channel through which tying is protable at the expense of rival rms. We emphasize that
our leverage mechanism does not have any credibility issue in sharp contrast to Whinston
(1990) and Nalebu¤ (2004). Our mechanism thus does require neither technical tying as
a commitment device as in Whinston (1990) nor the controversial assumption that the
tying rm is a Stackelberg leader in setting prices as in Nalebu¤ (2004).11 We show that a
monopolists tying is credible and reduces the rivals prot if the tied market is two-sided,
which provides a justication for the use of contractual tying. We further show that tying
is credible and forecloses the rival even in the case of perfect complements. This result
is noteworthy because it is known that a monopolist selling a perfectly complementary
product has no incentive to practice tying to exclude the rival (Proposition 3 of Whinston,
1990).
Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Carlton and Waldman (2002) provide a dynamic
leverage theory of tying. In Choi and Stefanadis (2001), the probability of successful
entry depends on the level of R&D expenditures. When an incumbent monopolist in
two complementary components practices bundling, it makes entry in one component
completely dependent upon success in the other. By making the prospects of investment
less certain, bundling discourages rivals from investing and innovating. Carlton and
10See also Chen (1997).
11A notable exception is Peitz (2008), who points out the credibility issue and builds an example
in which a monopolists tying is credible and reduces the rivals prot. Hurkens, Jeon and Menicucci
(2016) restores credibility by considering that the tying rm is not a monopolist but a dominant rm
facing competition in the tying market. In the context of competition among product portfolios in a
common agency setting, Jeon and Menicucci (2006, 2012) nd that pure bundling is credible as it reduces
competition among the products within a rms portfolio but that competitive bundling leads to e¢ cient
outcome if the buyer has no budget constraint (otherwise, bundling builds an entry barrier since it allows
rms with large portfolios to capture all the budget).
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Waldman (2002) construct a model of bundling with dynamic entry deterrence. In their
two-period model, the incumbent initially has a monopoly position in both the primary
and the complementary market. There is a potential rival that has the opportunity
to enter the complementary market in period 1 and the primary market in period 2.
Furthermore, the potential rival can recoup its xed cost of entry into the complementary
market only by actively operating in both periods. By practicing bundling, the incumbent
prevents the competitors complementary component from having access to customers in
period 1, permanently blocking the products introduction. As a result, the rival also
refrains from entering the primary market; entry without a complementary component
would not be protable. The incumbent maintains its monopoly prots in both periods.
However, most papers in the literature consider one-sided markets. We show how the
two-sidedness of markets in conjunction with the non-negative price constraint generates a
new channel through which monopoly power in one market can be leveraged into another.
Amelio and Jullien (2012) analyze the e¤ects of tying in two-sided markets. They
consider a situation in which platforms would like to set prices below zero on one side
of the market to solve the demand coordination problem in two-sided markets, but are
constrained to set non-negative prices. In the analysis of Amelio and Jullien, tying can
serve as a mechanism to introduce implicit subsidies on one side of the market in order
to solve the aforementioned coordination failure in two-sided markets. As a result, tying
can raise participation on both sides and can benet consumers in the case of a monopoly
platform. In a duopoly context, however, tying also has a strategic e¤ect on competition.
They show that the e¤ects of tying on consumer surplus and social welfare depend on
the extent of asymmetry in externalities between the two sides. Their paper and ours are
very di¤erent in terms of focus and mechanisms through which tying a¤ects competition.
Their main focus is to compare the e¤ects of tying across di¤erent market structures
(monopolistic vs. duopolistic) whereas our focus is on the leverage of monopoly power
in two-sided markets. Choi (2010) and de Cornière and Taylor (2017) also analyze tying
in two-sided markets. The main focus in Choi (2010) is on the role of multi-homing on
both sides of the market. In particular, he shows that tying can be welfare-enhancing
if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the
absence of multi-homing. Motivated by the Google Android case, de Cornière and Taylor
(2017) study a setting in which application developers compete to have their applications
installed on devices. They show how bundling lowers the device manufacturers outside
option and allows multi-application developer to extract more surplus when applications
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are a main driver of consumer demand.
Finally, Iacobucci (2014) develops a similar idea to our mechanism. In particular, he
argues that the elimination of competition via tying of two platforms in one side of the
market can expand the set of customers to whom the tying platform can sell in the other
side of the market. This is similar to our mechanism in which capturing the customer
side provides additional revenue from the advertiser side. However, he does not provide
a formal analysis as his argument is based on a numerical example. In addition, his logic
breaks down when the non-negative price constraint is not binding as the same e¤ects can
be achieved by an appropriate pricing scheme without the use of tying. This is due to
his implicit assumption that without tying, platforms in the tied product market set price
equal to marginal cost on each side in a competitive equilibrium. However, this does not
need to hold as zero prot condition for the platforms requires only the total price to be
equal to the total marginal cost. In contrast, we provide a rigorous and formal analysis
of tying that fully accounts for intricacies of two-sided markets.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we present the
baseline model of homogenous consumers to highlight the main essence of the leverage
mechanism in two-sided markets and the importance of the non-negative price constraint.
We also establish the robustness of our mechanism to multihoming and perfect comple-
ments. In section 3, we demonstrate the applicability of our framework to other types of
markets with auxiliary revenues. In section 4, we extend the baseline model by introduc-
ing heterogenous consumers in the tying market and investigate how the two-sidedness of
both the tying and tied product markets interact to draw policy implications. In section
5, we consider a model with inter-group network e¤ects in the tied good market. We
provide concluding remarks in section 6. Detailed proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Baseline Model of Homogenous Consumers
To show how the interaction between the two-sidedness of markets and the non-negative
price constraint generates new incentives to tie, we start by analyzing a simple baseline
model of homogenous consumers. In order to highlight the leverage mechanism in two-
sided markets, we consider a setting in which the well-known "single monopoly prot"
result holds and hence the extension of monopoly power from one market to another is
not possible in the benchmark without two-sided markets.
Consider two markets, A and B. We build a simple framework to analyze tying as a
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leverage mechanism when both markets are characterized as two-sided. More specically,
in each market there are three classes of agents. There are two distinct customer groups
(consumers and advertisers) that interact with each other and intermediaries which enable
these two groups to meetwith each other. In the example of the Internet search market,
the two customer groups can be described as advertisers and consumers (who search for
information through the Internet). The intermediaries are search engine providers such
as Google and Bing. We assume that the two markets are independent in the sense that
the value that each consumer (or advertiser) derives from participating in a market is
independent of whether he or she participates in the other market.
To analyze incentives to leverage market power, we assume that market A is served
by rm 1, a monopolistic platform, and entry to market A is not possible. In contrast,
two platforms, rm 1 and rm 2, compete in market B. More specically, we envision
a competitive bottleneck situation in which platforms provide services (such as Internet
search and video streaming) to consumers and use the customer base to derive advertising
revenues from advertisers who need access to consumers. There is a mass one of identical
consumers, who have a unit demand for each service/product. To focus on the strategic
motive for bundling, we assume that there is no cost advantage or disadvantage associated
with bundling.
In market A, each consumers reservation value is denoted by u. In market B, each
consumers willingness to pay for each rms product is given by v1 and v2, respectively,
where   v2   v1 > 0.12 For most of the paper, we assume that each consumer buys
only one of the two products in market B and normalize rmsproduction costs to zero
in all markets.13 This single-homing assumption is relaxed in section 2.3. Each consumer
yields additional prot of   0 and   0 to the advertiser side in market A and B,
respectively.14 If  = 0, the tying market is one-sided and if  = 0, the tied market is
one-sided.
12This is a standard assumption in the leverage theory of tying to analyze potential exclusion of more
e¢ cient rival rms. This assumption is made to facilitate comparison with the prior literature, and
should not be taken to imply that Google products are inferior to rival rms.
13This is not an innocuous normalization assumption with the non-negative price constraint because
it also implies no below-cost pricing. However, as long as production costs are not too high (as would
be the case for digital goods), our results would be robust even if we allow below-cost pricing. More
importantly, we can derive qualitatively similar results when we introduce asymmetry between the two
rms in market B in terms of production costs rather than product qualities.
14Alternatively,  and  can represent additional revenues coming from sale of consumer data to third
parties or in-app purchases. See de Cornière and Taylor (2017).
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2.1 The Leverage Mechanism with the Non-Negative Price Constraint in
Two-Sided Markets
Consider the benchmark in which both markets are one-sided (i.e.,  =  = 0). If
these products are sold independently without tying, rm 1 will charge pA1 = u in its
monopolized market A. In market B, both rms compete in prices and the equilibrium
prices are given by pB1 = 0 and p
B
2 = , where   v2   v1 > 0. All consumers buy from
rm 2. Each rms prots are given by
1 = 
A
1 + 
B
1 = u+ 0 = u;
B2 = :
Now suppose that rm 1 ties its monopolized product A with product B1: Let eP andep2 denote the bundle price and rm 2s price for product B under tying.15 We assume
that a consumer buys either the (A;B1) bundle or product B2: this assumption is relaxed
by allowing multi-homing in section 2.3. Then, rm 1 will be able to sell its bundled
products only if
u+ v1   eP  v2   ep2:
Since rm 2 will be willing to set the price as low as its marginal cost, which is zero,
the maximum price rm 1 can charge for its bundle in order to make sales is given byeP = u : Under tying, rm 1s prot is given by
e1 = max[u ; 0];
which is less than the prot without tying as e1 = max[u ; 0] < u = 1.16 Thus, even
if tying provides a mechanism to capture the tied good market, it is a Pyrrhic victory as
it reduces rm 1s prots. Thus, the monopoly rm has no incentives to tie to extend its
market power to the other market. This is the essence of the Chicago schools criticism of
the leverage theory of tying. However, this conclusion can be overturned if the tied good
market B is two-sided.
Suppose now that market B is two-sided while market A is one-sided. Assume that
the advertising revenue is large enough in market B such that  >  holds.17 Due to
15We denote variables under the tying regime with a tilde (~).
16If v1  v2, rm 1s prot with tying is the same as the one without tying.
17According to the estimates by nancial analyst Richard Windsor, Google made about $11 billion in
9
this additional revenue source, now each rm in market B is willing to set its price below
its marginal cost on the consumer side up to . We, however, put a non-negative price
restriction that the market prices cannot be negative. Thus, in the absence of tying, once
again rm 1 charges a price of pB1 = 0 and rm 2 will set the price of p
B
2 = . Firm 1s
prot in market B is zero. However, note that rm 2prot is given by B2 = +  due
to the additional revenue from the advertiser side.
Now suppose that rm 1 ties its monopolized product with product B on the consumer
side. Assume u >  such that rm 1 can conquer market B by tying. Once again, the
maximum bundle price that enables the tying rm to make sales is given by eP = u :
However, due to the additional revenue source in market B, the tying rms prot now
becomes e1 = u + (  ) > u = 1: Hence, tying is protable if the tied good market
is two-sided.
Tying reduces welfare because it induces consumers to use the inferior product of rm
1. However, consumers benet from tying due to reduced prices. Consumer surplus
without tying can be expressed as CS = (u+ v2)  (u+) = v1: With tying, consumer
surplus is fCS = (u + v1)   (u  ) = v1 +  = v2(> v1 = CS). This may explain why
the driving force behind the European action was a consortium of Googles competitors
rather than consumers (Stewart, 2016).18
This simple model also illustrates the importance of the non-negative price constraint
for the two-sidedness of the market to restore incentives to tie.19 To see this, suppose
that rms can charge a negative price. Then, after tying rm 2 would be willing to set
the price as low as  : Thus, the maximum bundle price that enables the tying rm to
make sales is now given by eP = u      : As a result, the tying rms prots is now
reduced to e1 = u  < u = 1 as in the Chicago school benchmark case above.
As the non-negative price constraint is essential to our leverage mechanism, the ap-
plicability of our theory depends on the plausibility of the constraint. Whether the con-
straint is binding or not may depend on market characteristics. In the credit card industry,
2015 from advertising sales on Android phones through its apps such as Maps, Search and Gmail. See
Chee (2016).
18However, we should emphasize that this result on consumer surplus is not robust to heterogenous
consumers, as shown in the Web Appendix. In addition, our analysis is completely static in that it does
not consider innovation and product development incentives with product o¤erings in the market given.
If tying deters entry of more innovative products in the future, dynamic consumer surplus can be lower
with tying.
19Our leverage theory can also be applied to other kinds of price restrictions such as price regulations
that prohibt a price below a certain level.
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for instance, cashback reward programs that o¤er rebates on card holderspurchases can
be considered as a negative price. In this case, however, there is a built-in mechanism
to prevent moral hazard and abuse of the program because consumers are not expected
to spend 100 dollars just to receive a 1 dollar rebate. Thus, the non-negative price con-
straint in the credit card industry is less plausible. By contrast, in the case of search
engines the constraint is more binding. To see this, suppose that Google pays a small
amount of money to anyone performing a Google search. There would be consumers
who do Google searches all day just to collect money, or people could create a software
program that does automated search on their behalf. Such behaviors would undermine
Googles business model, because the only reason advertisers pay money to Google is for
targeted advertising tailored to those who do real searches. The same logic applies if we
interpret  as revenues from in-app purchases. The app producers can generate  only
from consumers who actually use the program. With a zero or negative price, there can
be consumers who receive free items or free money from the app but never actually use
it and thus do not make any in-app purchases.
Finally, we can consider the case in which the tying market is two-sided (i.e.,  > 0).
This would increase rm 1s prot by  regardless of tying as long as it sells its monopoly
product. Hence, whether the tying market is one-sided or two-sided does not a¤ect the
incentive to tie.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 1. Consider the baseline model of homogenous consumers in which products
have independent values.
(i) Tying is never protable and hence the single monopoly prot result holds either if
the tied-market is one-sided or if rms can charge negative prices.
(ii) Suppose u > . Tying is protable if the tied-market is two-sided such that  > 
holds and rms cannot charge negative prices. Then, tying reduces both rm 2s prot
and social welfare, but increases consumer surplus.
(iii) Whether the tying market is one-sided or two-sided does not a¤ect the above
results.
Our simple model demonstrates two important di¤erences between the case of a one-
sided tied product and that of a two-sided tied product, both of which are generated by
the non-negative price constraint. First, in the absence of tying, rm 2 realizes a prot
beyond its competitive advantage: its prot per consumer is larger than  by , which
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cannot be competed away due to the binding non-negative price constraint that rm 1
faces. This creates an incentive for rm 1 to practice tying in order to subsidize its product
B by circumventing the constraint of non-negative pricing. Second, when rm 1 practices
tying and is e¤ectively engaging in negative pricing for the tied product, rm 2 would
respond more aggressively against tying. However, its aggressive response can be limited
as rm 2 hits the zero price oor even though it is willing to set a price as low as  :
Therefore, tying in two-sided markets can be immune to an aggressive price response by
the rival rm because the non-negative price constraint limits an aggressive response.20
Tying reduces welfare as it induces consumers to consume the inferior product of rm
1 instead of the superior product of rm 2 in market B. This force will be preserved in any
extension. However, tying may increase welfare by expanding the sale of the monopoly
product, which we examine in a model of heterogenous consumers in market A in sections
4 and 5.
Three remarks are in order. First, the result in Proposition 1(ii) that tying increases
consumer surplus has to do with the fact that tying reduces rm 2s price from  to
zero and results from the assumption of homogenous consumers. Instead, if consumers
are heterogenous in terms of their valuations of rm 2s product, then rm 2 may nd it
optimal to charge a zero price in the absence of tying because of the advertising revenue.
In this case, tying will not a¤ect the price charged by rm 2 and hence will not increase
consumer surplus. Second, for a similar reason, Proposition 1(iii) is likely to be an artifact
of the assumption of homogenous consumers. In order to investigate how the degree of
two-sidedness in the tying market (captured by ) a¤ects rm 1s incentive to tie, we
consider heterogenous consumers in the tying market in sections 4 and 5. Third, we
implicitly assumed that rm 2 is a single product rm and cannot engage in its own tying
arrangement with another product (say, product C) as a counter-strategy to circumvent
the non-negative price constraint. This implicit assumption can be challenged in the
context of independent products. However, if we consider complementary products,
especially when product A is an essential product for the use of B and monopolized by
rm 1, such a counter-strategy is not available to rm 2. We thus show how our model
can be easily extended to the complentary product case.
20In the actual Google case, competition in search engines takes place mainly with payments to OEMs
for pre-installation of the applications (not to consumers), which can be at odds with our assumption of
non-negative pricing. We address this issue in section 2.4.2.
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2.2 Extension to Perfect Complements
We show that our leverage mechanism can also be applied when the tying and the tied
products are complements. This extension is important because most antitrust cases in
tying entails complementary products, including the Google Android and the Microsoft
Windows Media Player cases which motivated our study. As mentioned above, the com-
plementary product case can also justify our implicit assumption that only the monopoly
rm is able to use tying as a mechanism to engage in negative pricing for the tied product.
Suppose that the monopoly product A of rm 1 and product B are perfect comple-
ments that need to be used together. Consumers can use one of the two system products,
(A;B1) and (A;B2), depending on which rms product B is used. Consumersvaluation
for system (A;Bi) is given by u+ vi, where i = 1; 2 and   v2  v1 > 0. Once again, we
demonstrate that the non-negative price constraint (in conjunction with the two-sidedness
of the tied good market) can create incentives to tie even for the perfect complements
case. Assume  = 0.21
As a benchmark, consider rst the case in which the non-negative price constraint is not
binding. Without tying, rms are willing to cut the price down to   for product B and
rm 2s prot can never be larger than . In fact, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria
due to rm 1s ability to "price squeeze" and extract a portion of the surplus  (Choi
and Stefanadis, 2001). More precisely, there is a continuum of equilibria parameterized
by  2 [0; 1], which represents the degree of price squeeze exercised by rm 1:
bpA1 = u+ v1 +  + ; bpB1 =  , bpB2 =   + (1  )
In equilibrium, consumers purchase the system that includes B2.22 Firm 1s prot is
1 = bpA1 = u + v1 +  +  and rm 2s prot is 2 = bpB2 +  = (1   ). It can be
easily veried that no rm has an incentive to deviate because they jointly extract the
full surplus from consumers.
With tying, only system (A;B1) is available to consumers since products A and B are
perfect complements. Firm 1s prot under tying is e1 = u + v1 +  (< 1) while rm
2s prot is zero. Therefore, for any  2 [0; 1], rm 1 has no incentive to practice tying
21As in the analysis of products having independent values, adding  > 0 does not a¤ect the analysis.
22We adopt the standard tie-breaking convention that if a consumer is indi¤erent between buying
product B from rms 1 and 2, he will buy from rm 2 (the high-quality product producer) because this
convention is equivalent to dening price equilibrium as the limit in which prices must be named in some
discrete unit of account of size  as ! 0:
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to exclude the superior complementary product of the rival rm. This result reconrms
Whinston s (1990) nding (i.e., Proposition 3, p.851) and lends support to the Chicago
schools criticism of the leverage theory.23
Consider now the case in which the non-negative price constraint is binding. Without
tying, once again, we have a continuum of equilibria parameterized by  2 [0; 1]:
pA1 = u+ v1 + ; p
B
1 = 0, p
B
2 = (1  ):
The non-negativity constraint binds for rm 1s product B (i.e., pB1 = 0). As a result,
consumers prefer buying B2 at any price pB2 smaller than . This means that rm 2
captures the advertising revenue  while rm 1 can extract  2 [0; 1] fraction of  from
rm 2. Hence, each rms prot without tying is given by:
1 = u+ v1 + ; 2 = p
B
2 +  = (1  ) + .
With tying, rm 1 can charge eP = u+ v1 and receives a prot of e1 = eP + = u+ v1+
and rm 2s prot is zero. Hence, as long as  > , rm 1 has an incentive to tie
regardless of the value of .
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 2. Consider the extension of the baseline model of homogenous consumers
to perfect complements.
(i) If rms can charge negative prices, tying is never protable regardless of whether
the tied-market is one-sided or two-sided.
(ii) If rms cannot charge negative prices and the tied-market is two-sided enough
(i.e.,  > ), tying is protable regardless of the degree of price squeeze prevailing in the
absence of tying.
We provide a novel mechanism for leveraging monopoly power though tying for the
case of perfect complements; to the best of our knowledge, such theory has not been
developed yet in the previous literature. For instance, our theory may be applied to the
Microsoft tying cases in which the operating system was bundled together with other
complementary applications such as a web browser and a media player. Our theory also
23For instance, according to Posner (1976, p. 173), "[A fatal] weakness of the leverage theory is its
inability to explain why a rm with a monopoly of one product would want to monopolize complementary
products as well. It may seem obvious ... but since the products are by hypothesis used in conjunction
with one another ... it is not obvious at all."
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exposes the aw in the reasoning of Iacobucci (2014) who proposes a theory of tying for
perfect complements in two-sided markets: the two-sidedness is a necessary condition for
tying to be credible, but not a su¢ cient condition because it should be combined with
the non-negativity constraint in pricing as we have shown above.
2.3 Extension to Multihoming
Up to now, we have assumed that multihoming is impossible. We here allow consumers
to do multihoming at some cost. The multihoming cost may be due to the limited screen
space, limited storage space, or purely psychological default bias. Let m denote the
multihoming cost. Consumers are heterogenous in terms of the multihoming cost, which
is assumed to be distributed over [0;m] according to distributionG(:) with strictly positive
density g(:), where m =1 is allowed. In addition, assume that the density function g(:)
is log-concave and
m > , G()=g()  :
With a log-concave density function, G(:)=g(:) is increasing. Thus, G()=g()   means
that the revenue from the advertising side is large enough in market B compared to the
degree of superiority of rm 2s product . Note that the introduction of multihoming
does not a¤ect the analysis of no tying as there is no multihoming. We below extend the
tying analysis of Section 2.1. Consider  = 0 and  > 0.24
Our analysis shows that the equilibrium prices with multi-homing are the same as those
in the previous analysis where multihoming is not feasible. We thus have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider the baseline model of homogenous consumers in which products
have independent values. Suppose that multi-homing is possible.
(i) Without tying, all consumers use the superior product of rm 2 in market B and
no consumers multi-home.
(ii) With tying, the equilibrium prices are given by eP = u  and ep2 = 0: Consumers
whose multi-homing cost is less than  multi-home. Tying is protable if  > 
[1 G()] ;
that is,  is relatively large compared to . Social welfare always decreases with tying even
though consumers are better o¤.
Proof. See the Appendix.
24Analyzing the case of  > 0 does not a¤ect the result because rm 1s prot increases by the same
amount of  with or without tying.
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Proposition 3 indicates that Proposition 1(ii) naturally extends and is robust to the
possibility of multi-homing. Introducing multihoming does not a¤ect the equilibrium
prices and those whose multihoming cost is above  buy only the bundle (while all
the others multihome). Tying reduces welfare because single-homing consumers use the
inferior tied product while those who multihome incur the cost of multihoming. However,
tying increases every consumers surplus at the expense of rm 2, as rm 2 charges a
zero price and captures a smaller market share. More precisely, in the absence of tying
each consumer has a surplus of v1. Under tying with multi-homing, a consumer receives
a surplus of v1+ +max[0; m]: Firm 2s prots decrease from ( + ) to G().
In the rest of the paper, we maintain the single-homing assumption.
2.4 Applications to the Microsoft Windows Media Player and the Google
Android Cases
We have developed a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets with the non-negative
price constraint in the tied good market, motivated by the Microsoft Windows Media
Player and Google Android cases. We breiy discuss how our model (or a varition of it)
can be applied to these cases.
2.4.1 The Microsoft Windows Media Player Case
One of the major European antitrust cases concerned Microsofts tying of its Windows
Media Player (WMP) product with its dominant Windows operating system. The Eu-
ropean Commission concluded that this tying arrangement "deprived PC manufacturers
and nal users of a free choice over which products they want to have on their PCs,"
thereby violating the EU Treatys competition rules (Article 82).25 A theory of harm in
this case is di¤erent from Microsofts bundling of Internet Explorer in Windows because
in the browser case a successful rival browser has the potential to evolve into a substitute
for Windows whereas a rival media player is not considered as such a threat.
The Commissions decision was mainly based on "foreclosure to competition outside
the tying-tied product pair" (italics original) and Fumagalli et al. (2018) state that "the
Commission could have spelled out its theory of harm in a clearer way" and nd that the
model proposed by Carlton and Waldman (2012) may support the Commissions decision
25See the European Commission Press Release entitled "Commission concludes on Microsoft investi-
gation, imposes conduct remedies and a ne," (IP/04/382) released on March 24, 2004. Available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-382_en.htm?locale=en
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in this case.26 Carlton andWaldmans (2012) model is based on product upgrades. In their
dynamic model, tying provides a mechanism to foreclose competition in the development
and supply of rival complementary products, thereby allowing the tying rm to extract
surplus from its own product upgrades in the future. Their model captures an important
aspect of the market because Microsofts application programs are periodically upgraded.
In theWMP case, however, all media players including the major rival product Real Player
in the market were available at a zero price. In addition, subsequently upgraded products
were also supplied at a zero price, which makes their model less directly applicable.
Our model can be used to provide a coherent theory of harm in this case by explicitly
acknowledging the two-sidedness of the media player market. As typical in two-sided mar-
kets, media players on the consumer side are subsidized with a zero price. Instead, the
main sources of revenues are "content encoding software, format licensing, wireless infor-
mation device software, DRM solutions and online music delivery" while the media player
market serves as "a strategic gateway to a range of related markets."27 The additional
revenues coming from these related markets can be captured by the parameter  in our
model. The remedy imposed by the Commission can also be rationalized by our model.
In addition to a ne of 497 million Euro, the Commission required Microsoft to o¤er a
version of its Windows PC operating system without Windows Media Player (WMP). In
particular, Microsoft was not allowed to o¤er consumers a discount conditional on their
buying Windows together with WMP. This requirement can be interpreted as shutting
down a channel through which Microsoft can engage in negative pricing for its media
player in our model.28
2.4.2 The Google Android Case
In the Google Android case, the EC issued a statement of objections on April 20, 2016,
informing Google of its view that "the company has, in breach of EU antitrust rules,
abused its dominant position by imposing restrictions on Android device manufacturers
and mobile network operators."29 Even though Googles Android operating system for
mobile devices is supposed to be "open," Google e¤ectively implements bundling of its
26See Fumagalli et al. (2018), pp. 453-456, for a more detailed discussion of the case.
27Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Para 975.
28See also Ayres and Nalebu¤ (2005) for a discussion of the remedy.
29See the European Commission Press Release entitled "Antitrust: Commission sends State-
ment of Objections to Google on Android operating system and applications," available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm
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apps through Androids Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (MADA) contracts
that force manufacturers to include them and their respective terms in an all-or-nothing
fashion.30 According to MADA contracts, Android device manufacturers must preinstall
all or none of Google apps, depriving them of the ability to mix and match Google
apps considered essential with other third-party apps which may be superior to some of
the listed Google apps. Even though they are allowed to preinstall competing apps in
addition to the listed Google apps with similar functionalities, they are reluctant to do so
because of the limited screen space available on devices and potential user confusion.31 In
addition, Google requires its apps to be the default in key app categories such as search
and location and be placed in prominent positions on the screen.32 As a result, the
potential for installing multiple apps (i.e., multihoming) to mitigate the e¤ects of tying is
somewhat limited (Edelman, 2015). The ECs analysis in relation to the investigation of
Google also indicates that "consumers rarely download applications that would provide
the same functionality as an app that is already pre-installed (unless the pre-installed app
is of particularly poor quality)."33
Actual antitrust cases are fact-intensive and our model does not perfectly t with
the current Google case in one important aspect. More specically, the assumption of
non-negative prices is more appropriate for consumers, but in reality mobile phone man-
ufacturers make decisions on which apps to pre-install and app developers can make
payments to OEMs to have their apps to be pre-installed, which e¤ectively constitutes a
negative price for consumers if the payments to OEMs are passed along to consumers.
However, as shown by Etro and Ca¤arra (2017), a sensible extension of our model
that closely approximates the facts of the Android case can be developed to address
this issue.34 For the sake of concreteness, consider Google Play as the (monopolized)
tying good (as there are no e¤ective competitors) and Google search as the tied good (for
30"Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications [listed elsewhere in the agreement] ... are
pre-installed on the Device." See section 2.1 of the MADA between Google and HTC.
31Other considerations that limit pre-installation of competing apps include their impacts on RAM,
battery life, and limited storage space.
32For instance, the phone manufacturer must set Google Search ... as the default search provider for
all Web search access points. See MADA Section 3.4(4). The same requirement applies to Googles
Network Location Provider service.
33See the European Commission - Fact Sheet entitled "Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of
Objections to Google on Android operating system and applications,released on April 20, 2016. Available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1484_en.htm.
34See Etro and Ca¤ara (2017) for more detailed discussion of the Android case and how they extend
our model.
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which there are some potential competitors).35 Google supplies its Google Mobile Service
suite that includes the application store Google Play working with Google Play Services
("GP/GPS suite") for free. As explained by Etro and Ca¤arra (2017), there are multiple
reasons for Google to provide its GP/GPS suite without any charges. First, the GP/GPS
suite needed to be o¤ered for free for strategic reasons such as market penetration and
building an installed base of consumers when its Android mobile operating system was
rst introduced in 2007 as there were other competing alternatives such as Symbian and
Windows Mobile. In addition, application stores such as Google Play themselves can
be considered as a two-sided market that can generate revenues from the other side by
receiving a percentage of revenues from application developers.
Let the value of Google Play be u(> 0). As in Etro and Ca¤arra (2017), it can
also be interpreted as the di¤erence in quality between normal Android devices with the
GP/GPS suite and "forked" Android devices that lack Google Play, YouTube and other
apps in the GP/GPS suite. This implies that Google has a "surplus slack" in the tying
good market (due to its free availability), which can be leveraged to the tied good market
via bundling. Note that in the Chicago school critique of the leverage theory, the tying
rm is extracting all surplus in the tying good market in the absence of bundling, which
renders bundling unprotable. If the tying rm is not extracting all surplus in the tying
good market (as in the case of GP/GPS suite), we can restore incentives to tie.36
To illustrate this idea, we consider the same model as in section 2.1, but we allow
negative prices in the tied good market whereas there is a non-positive price constraint
(or zero price commitment) in the tying good market. This implies that the tying rm
can use the surplus of u in competition for the tied good because its price for the tying
good is constrained to be zero (pA1 = 0). This set-up can be considered as a duality model
(with the non-positive price constraint in the tying good market) to our baseline model.37
Without tying, the only source for rm 1s prot in market A is from the advertiser
side with A1 = : In market B, rm 1 is willing to set its price below its marginal cost
on the consumer side up to  with pB1 =  : In response, rm 2 charges a price of pB2
=   + with a prot of B2 = :
35See Edelman and Geradin (2016) and the ECs press release available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1484_en.htm.
36Greenlee et al. (2008) develop a similar idea, showing how imperfect rent extration in the monopoly
market can provide incentives to tie.
37Note that the assumption of commitment to a zero price in the tying good market can be relaxed
with heterogenous consumers. As shown by Etro and Ca¤arra (2017), what is important is that the
tying rm cannot extract all the surplus of consumers from the tying good.
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Now suppose that rm 1 ties its monopolized product with product B on the consumer
side. We consider a scenario in which the zero price commitment still applies to the
bundled products.38 Then, rm 1 is able to sell its bundled products only if
u+ v1  v2   ep2:
As rm 2 is willing to charge a price as low as ep2 =  , the condition for rm 1 to sell
its bundled products can be written as
u  + :
The tying rms prot under bundling with the zero price commitment is given by e1 =
+: Thus, if u  +, tying is protable, restoring incentives to tie. Once again, social
welfare decreases as consumers use an ine¢ cient product B1 rather than B2. As noted by
Etro and Ca¤ara, in this set-up, consumerssurplus is also reduced from (u+ v1 + ) to
(u+ v1):
Finally, a variation of our model can also be applied to provide a theory of harm in the
Google shopping case if we interpret Googles prominence to its own shopping service as
tying "Google search" with "Google shopping."39 We can consider  as the advertising
revenue brought by consumers using a general search engine (market A) and  the revenue
brought by clicking on shopping(or price comparison site) web pages (market B). In
this case, we can impose a zero price constraint on both markets as both general search
and price comparison sites do not charge users directly. With this simple modication,
we can easily establish incentives to tie and social welfare and consumer surplus losses
associated with tying because userschoice is restricted.40
3 Applications to Other Markets with Ancillary Revenues
We have developed a leverage theory of tying in the context of two-sided markets. How-
ever, our insight can be applied to any market in which sales to consumers in one market
can generate additional revenues that cannot be competed away due to non-negative price
38We can also consider an alternative scenario in which the bundle price can di¤er from zero. We can
derive qualitatively the same results with this alternative scenario. In fact, the condition for protable
tying becomes weaker, which is given by  > :
39See the European Commissioin Press Release IP/17/1784 (June 27, 2017) and Fumagalli (2017).
40We thank Massimo Motta for suggesting the applicability of our model to the Google shopping case.
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constraints. This additional revenue came from the other side of the market in the case
of a two-sided market. The additional revenues can also be generated in an intertemporal
context with the other market being the same market in the future. To illustrate this
idea, we present two variations of the baseline model with  =  = 0.
3.1 Tying in Markets with (Direct) Network E¤ects
Market A is the same as in the baseline model. Market B is characterized with network
e¤ects. We adopt a simplied and modied version of Katz and Shapiros (1986) dynamic
technology adoption model with network e¤ects for market B. Let us assume a stationary
environment with respect to both rmstechnologies.41 There are two periods. In period
t (= 1; 2), N t consumers of generation t make a purchase decision. For simplicity, assume
N1 = N2. Each period, two rms compete with incompatible products B1 and B2. A
consumer who purchases product B1 in period t derives net benets of v1+(x1+x2) pt1,
and the corresponding value from product B2 is given by v2+(y1+y2) pt2; where xt and
yt denote the quantities of product B1 and B2, respectively, sold in period t. Consumers
have the same preferences and coordinate on the Pareto-e¢ cient outcome when there
are multiple equilibria. Once again, rmsproduction costs are zero in all markets and
 = v2  v1 > 0.
In the absence of tying, rm 1 charges a price of pA1 = u in its monopolized market A.
In market B, suppose that rm 1 has captured market B in the rst period. This confers
rm 1 an installed-base advantage in period 2. Let us assume that this installed-base
advantage is su¢ ciently large such that b   2 > , where b = (N1 + N2) and t
= (N t). Then, rm 1 will be able to maintain its market dominance with a price of
(b   2)   . If rm 2 has captured market B in the rst period, it can maintain the
dominance at a price of (b   2) + :
Now consider market competition in the rst period. If rm 2 decides to capture the
market in period 1, its price needs to satisfy
v1 + 
b   p11  v2 + b   p12:
Firm 1 is willing to charge a price equal to  [(b   2)   ] < 0. However, the non-
negative price constraint limits its price at zero. Given this, rm 2 is able to sell at a
41In contrast, Katz and Shapiro (1986) assume a situation in which one technology is better than the
other in the rst period but becomes inferior in the second period to derive interesting dynamics.
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price of  in the rst period. As a result, each rms overall prot is given by
1 = (1 + )u;
B2 = + [(
b   2) + ]:
Now suppose that rm 1 ties its monopolized product A with product B1. Consider
a subgame in which all consumers bought the bundle in the rst period. Let eP 2 and ep22
denote the bundle price and rm 2s price for product B in period 2 under tying. Then,
rm 1 will be able to sell its bundled products if
u+ v1 + 
b   eP 2  v2   ep22 + 2:
Since rm 2 will be willing to set the price as low as its marginal cost, which is zero,
the maximum price rm 1 can charge for its bundle in order to make sales is given byeP 2 = u + (b   2). Under tying, rm 1s prot in the second period is given by
e21 = u + (b   2) > u:
If consumers bought from rm 2 in period 1, the maximum price rm 1 can charge for its
bundle in order to make sales is given by eP 2 = u   (b  2), which is assumed to be
positive with a su¢ ciently high u. Firm 1s prot in period 2 in this subgame is given by
e21 = u   (b   2):
Consider competition in period 1 under tying. If rm 1 decides to capture the market
in period 1, its price needs to satisfy
u+ v1 + 
b   eP 1  v2 + 1   ep12:
Note that b is present on the LHS but 1 on the RHS because rm 1 captures the second
period market regardless of who wins the rst-period one. Therefore, the highest price
that allows rm 1 to capture the market in period one is eP 1 = u + (b   1). In this
case, rm 1s overall prot is given by
e1 = e11 + e21 = (u ) + (b   1) + [u + (b   2)]
22
In contrast, if rm 1 gives up the market in period 1, its prot becomes e1 = e11 + e21 =
0 + (u    (b   2)). Thus, rm 1 chooses the rst option. Therefore, tying can be
protable if the following condition holds
e1 = (u ) + (b   1) + (u + (b   2)) > (1 + )u = 1;
that is,
(b   1) + (b   2) > (1 + ):
If N1 = N2 with 1 = 2, this condition simplies to
b   2 > :
Carlton and Waldman (2002) develop a related model of tying for complementary
products in the presence of network e¤ects. However, in their model tying is strategically
used to preserve monopoly power rather than extend monopoly power to another market.
In their model, for some parameter constellations the monopolist need not actually tie its
products and can achieve the same goal with a virtual tie by charging a "high" price for the
tying product and a "low" price for the tied product because they consider complementary
products. They point out that a real tie is needed when the non-negativity constraint
for the tied product is binding but do not systematically explore implications of the non-
negativity constraint as we do in the current paper.42
3.2 Tying in Markets with Switching Costs
Market A is the same as in the baseline model, monopolized by rm 1 with consumers
having valuation of u for the product. Market B is one-sided but characterized with a
switching costs of s (Klemperer, 1990). We consider a two-period model with a discount
factor of : Once again, rmsproduction costs are zero in all markets.
In the absence of tying, rm 1 charges a price of pA1 = u in its monopolized market
A. In market B, we apply backward induction to derive the equilibrium. Suppose that
rm 1 has captured market B in the rst period. In the second period, consumers need
to pay a switching cost of s to buy from rm 2. To illustrate the idea in the simplest
42They also provide a model with network e¤ects in which strategic tying is used to extend monopoly
power to the newly emerging market. However, their logic applies only when the tying and the tied
products are complementary and the new product in the emerging market is a perfect substitute for a
system consisting of the tying and the tied products.
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manner, let us assume that s >  = v2  v1 > 0 and (s ) < u: In this case, rm 1 will
be able to maintain its market dominance with a price of (s ): If rm 2 has captured
market B in the rst period, it can maintain the market at a price of (s+):
Now consider market competition in the rst period. For analytical simplicity, we
assume myopic consumers. Firm 1 is willing to charge a price which is  (s   ) < 0:
However, the non-negative price constraint limits its price at zero. Given this, rm 2 is
able to sell at a price of  in the rst period. As a result, each rms overall prots are
given by
1 = (1 + )u
B2 = + (s+)
Now suppose that rm 1 ties its monopolized product A with product B1: Consider
a subgame in which all consumers bought the bundle. Let eP 2 and ep22 denote the bundle
price and rm 2s price for product B2 in period 2 under tying. Then, rm 1 will be able
to sell its bundled products if
u+ v1   eP 2  v2   ep22   s:
Since rm 2 will be willing to set the price as low as its marginal cost, which is zero,
the maximum price rm 1 can charge for its bundle in order to make sales is given byeP 2 = u + s: Under tying, rm 1s prots in the second period are given by
e21 = u + s > u:
If consumers bought from rm 2 in period 1, the maximum price rm 1 can charge for its
bundle in order to make sales is given by eP 2 = u   s: Firm 1s prots in period 2 in
this subgame is given by e21 = u   s:
Consider competition in period 1 under tying. If rm 1 decides to capture the market
in period 1, its price needs to satisfy
u+ v1   eP 1  v2   ep12:
This implies that the highest price rm 1 can charge in period 1 and still capture the
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market is given by eP 1 = u : In this case, rm 1s overall prot is given by
e1 = e11 + e21 = (u ) + (u + s):
In contrast, if rm 1 gives up the market in period 1, its prot becomes e1 = e11 + e21 =
0+ (u   s): Thus, rm 1 chooses the rst option. Therefore, tying can be protable
if the following condition holds
e1 = (u ) + (u + s) > (1 + )u = 1;
which can be written as
s >
1 + 

:
s >
1 + 

:
4 Heterogenous Consumers in the Tying Market
In this section, we consider heterogeneous consumers in market A. To derive a closed-form
solution, we assume that u is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], which yields a linear demand
function in market A.43 Market B is modeled as in the baseline model.
In the absence of tying, the two platform markets can be analyzed independently. In
market B, the analysis is the same as in Section 2. In market A, rm 1 chooses p on the
consumer side to maximize
max
p
(p+ ) (1  p):
Under the non-negativity constraint on price, the monopolistic platforms optimal price
is given by
pm =
(
1 
2
if  < 1;
0 otherwise.
The optimal price in the consumer side decreases with the importance of advertising
revenue ().44
43The uniform distribution assumption is made for simplicity to derive a closed-form solution in our
model. We can derive qualitatively similar results with a more general distribution of u:
44We can assume a more general distribution of u. If u is distributed according to cdf G(:), the
maximization problem becomes max
p
(p+ ) [1   G(p)] and the optimal price is characterized by pm =
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Therefore, without tying, each rms prot is given by
1 = 
m =
(
(1+)2
4
if  < 1
 otherwise
; (1)
2 = + :
We assume  < 1=2. Under the assumption, if both rms charge zero price under
tying, rm 1s market share is larger than a half. Hence, this assumption implies that
rm 1 has a signicant ability to leverage its monopoly power in market B.
4.1 Equilibrium under Tying
Now suppose that rm 1 engages in tying on the consumer side. Consumers have two
choices: they can buy a bundled product/service from rm 1 or buy only product/service
B from rm 2. Let eP and ep2 be the bundle price by rm 1 and product B price by rm
2, respectively. The consumer type u who is indi¤erent between the bundled o¤ering and
rm 2s single product o¤ering satises the following condition:
(u + v1)  eP = v2   ep2,
which is equivalent to
u = ( eP   ep2) + :
As the bundle will be bought by consumers with valuations u  u, the demand for
the bundle is given by
D( eP ; ep2) =
8><>:
1  u = 1  [( eP   ep2) + ] if 0  ( eP   ep2) +   1
1 if 0  eP < ep2  
0 if eP > 1 + ep2   (2)
Firm 2s demand is 1 D( eP ; ep2). We have:
Lemma 1. Under tying
(i) Firm 1s best response is given by
BR1(ep2) = ( (1 ) (+)+ep22 for + [1  (+ )]  ep2 >   [1  (+ )] ;
max[0; ep2  ] otherwise.
1 G(pm)
g(pm)   : With a monotone hazard rate condition, it can be shown that pm() is decreasing in :
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(ii) Firm 2s best response is given by
BR2( eP ) = max[(  ) + eP
2
; 0]:
Therefore, we have to distinguish four cases depending on whether or not 1  > +
and/or  > . Let ( eP ; ep2) be the solution of
eP = (1 )  (+ ) + ep2
2
;
ep2 = (  ) + eP
2
:
That is,
eP  =   + 2(1  ) 
3
;
ep2 =   + 1  +
3
:
Then, depending on the relative magnitudes of two-sidedness parameters ( and )
and vertical di¤erentiation parameter , we have the following four cases for equilibrium
prices under tying.
Case 1 (Both  and  Small): 1  >  +  and  > .
In this case, the non-negative price constraints are not binding and we have eP  =eP (> 0) and ep2 = p(> 0):
Case 2 (Both  and  Large): 1  <  +  and  < .
eP  = 0; ep2 = 0:
Case 3 (Small  and Large ): 1  >  +  and  < .
In this case, it can be easily shown that eP  > ep2: Thus, the non-negative price
constraint is binding rst for the rival rms price under tying. We then have the following
result.
(i) If  < (1 )+
3
; eP  = eP  > 0; ep2 = ep2 > 0:
(ii) If  > (1 )+
3
,
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eP  = BR1(0) = (1 )  (+ )
2
; ep2 = 0:
Case 4 (Large  and Small ): 1  <  +  and  > .
This is the opposite of case 3 and the non-negative price constraint is binding rst for
the tying rm as eP  < ep2: We have the following result.
(i) If  < 2(1 ) 
3
; eP  = eP  > 0; ep2 = ep2 > 0:
(ii) If  > 2(1 ) 
3
,
eP  = 0; ep2 = BR2(0) =   2 :
The equilibrium price congurations under tying are summarized in Figure 1.
4.2 Incentives to Tie in Two-Sided Markets
We now analyze the monopolistic rms incentives to tie for each price conguration
regime.
 Case of eP  = 0 and ep2 = 0
This case corresponds to a situation in which both rmsnon-negative price constraints
are binding under tying because both  and  are relatively large compared to  (i.e.,
when 1   <  +  and  < ). With these prices, each rms market demand under
tying is given by eD1 = 1  and ed2 = :
Each rms corresponding prot under tying is given by
e1 = (1 ) (+ ) ;
e2 = :
Prot comparisons lead to:
Lemma 2. Consider the case when the equilibrium prices under tying are given by eP  =
0; ep2 = 0 (i.e., +  > 1  and  > ).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Price Congurations under Tying
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(i) Tying unambiguously reduces the rival rms prot.
(ii) Firm 1s incentive to tie increases with  and decreases with . More precisely,
tying is always protable for  < (1  2) and increases rm 1s prot if  > (1 )2+4
4(1 )
for (1  2) <  < 1 and if 

> 
1  for   1:
Tying reduces rm 2s prot by reducing its market share and its price. Firm 1s
incentive to tie increases with  since e1 increases with  but rm 1s prot without
tying does not depend on . This is consistent with the nding from the baseline model.
In addition, Lemma 2(ii) shows that rm 1s incentive to tie decreases with  for given
. This is very clear when  > 1: Then, in market A, tying generates a loss of  since
consumers with low valuations for the monopoly product buy rm 2s product instead of
the bundle.
 eP  > 0; ep2 = 0
This price regime arises when both  < 1  2 and 1    >  > (1   +)=3
hold. The latter condition implies  > . Essentially, market A is close to being one-sided
while market B is quite two-sided. This case is fundamentally the same as the baseline
model and we have:
Lemma 3. When the equilibrium prices under tying are given by eP  > 0 and ep2 = 0 (i.e.,
when both  < 1 2 and 1   >  > (1 +)=3 hold), tying is always protable
for rm 1 whereas tying always reduces the rival rms prot.
 Case of eP  > 0 and ep2 > 0
This price regime arises under tying when both  and  are relatively small compared
to : More precisely, the following condition needs to hold:
 <
(1  ) + 
3
if  < 1  2;
 <
2(1  ) 
3
if  > 1  2:
In this case, the non-negative price constraint is binding for neither rm as eP  = eP  >
0; ep2 = ep2 > 0:
Firm 1 and rm 2s demands are respectively given by
eD1 = 2 +  
3
; ed2 = (1  ) + 
3
:
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The corresponding prots are given by
e1 = 2 +  
3
2
; e2 = (1  ) + 
3
2
:
Since each rm reduces its price by ,  is competed away and therefore both rms
prots under tying are independent of . Note that the highest  that satises the
conditions above for this price regime is  = 1   
2
< 1: Hence, rm 1s prot under no
tying is 1 =
(1+)2
4
. We have e1 > 1 if and only if  < 1  2: The comparison of the
rival rms prots shows that e2 > 2 if  < h (1 )+3 i2  : We thus have the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider the case when the equilibrium prices under tying are given by eP  > 0
and ep2 > 0 (i.e., either  < (1 )+3 and  < 1 2 hold or  < 2(1 ) 3 and  > 1 2
hold).
(i) Tying is protable for rm 1 if and only if  < 1  2:
(ii) Tying increases the rival rms prots if and only if  <
h
(1 )+
3
i2
 :
(iii) When  =  = 0, tying is protable for both rms if  . 0:14590:
Note that the possibility of tying to relax competition and increase both rmsprots
can arise only when   7 3
p
5
2
' 0:14590: Lemma 4 implies that when  is small, tying
increases both rmsprots if both  and  are close to zero (i.e., when both markets
are essentially one-sided). For instance, when  =  = 0, Lemma 4(iii) shows that tying
increases both rmsprots if and only if  . 0:14590. This result replicates the insight
provided by Carbajo et al. (1990) for the case of standard one-sided markets. When
rms compete in prices, tying/bundling provides a mechanism to di¤erentiate products.
High valuation consumers for the tying product buy the bundled product whereas low
valuation consumers just buy the stand-alone product provided by the rival rm in the
tied good market. This relaxes competition in the tied good market. This intuition comes
out clearly if we consider an extreme case of  = 0. In this case, the tied good product
is homogeneous and the equilibrium price will be driven down to zero (or more generally
to MC if MC>0) and both rms receive zero prots in market B in the absence of tying.
With tying, both rms can increase prots by segmenting the market.
 Case of eP  = 0 and ep2 > 0
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This price regime arises when the following condition holds.
2(1  ) 
3
<  < :
The parameter restriction of  <  implies that market B is not two-sided enough
since the assumption in the baseline model  >  is violated. Moreover, the condition
implies 1   2 <  (i.e., market A can be quite two-sided). Therefore, tying is not
protable for rm 1. Tying reduces rm 2s prot as well by reducing its price and its
market share.
Lemma 5. When the equilibrium prices under tying are given by eP  = 0 and ep2 > 0 (i.e.,
when 2(1 ) 
3
<  <  holds), tying reduces both rmsprots.
For  large and  small, tying makes both rms more aggressive since the prices under
tying are lower than the prices without tying. It thereby reduces both rmsprots, which
is reminiscent of the nding of Whinston (1990).
All cases taken together, we can summarize our analysis so far in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4. Consider the model in which consumers are heterogenous in terms of
their valuations for the monopoly product. Assume 1=2 > .
(i) Firm 1s incentive to tie increases with  and decreases with . Specically, rm
1 has incentives to tie if  < (1   2): For  2 (1   2; 1); tying is protable if  >
(1 )2+4
4(1 ) : For  > 1; tying is protable if


> 
1  :
(ii) Tying is more likely to reduce rm 2s prot as  increases and as  increases.
Specically, tying reduces rm 2s prot unless  <
h
(1 )+
3
i2
  and  < (1  2).
The area in which tying is not protable for rm 1 is represented by the shaded area
in the right bottom corner of Figure 2. In all other areas tying is protable. For the rival
rm, the area in which tying is protable is represented as the triangle area near the origin
in Figure 2. In all other areas tying reduces the rival rms prot.
We make two remarks from our analysis. First, tying is protable and reduces the
rivals prot if  in the tied good market is su¢ ciently large. As a result, our leverage
mechanism does not have any credibility issue, in sharp contrast to the tying literature in
one-sided markets (Whinston (1990) and Nalebu¤ (2004)). More specically, our mecha-
nism does require neither technical tying as a commitment device as in Whinston (1990)
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nor the controversial assumption that the tying rm is a Stackelberg leader in setting
prices as in Nalebu¤ (2004). The use of contractual tying, even if it can be easily undone,
is su¢ cient for credible leverage. Second, tying reduces both rmsprots if  in the tying
good market is su¢ ciently large (relative to ). In the next section, we will investigate
how this second result is a¤ected by the presence of inter-group network e¤ects.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
The welfare e¤ects of tying in our model depend on whether or not the monopoly price
in market A is already zero (i.e.,   1) in the absence of tying.
Case 1. (Full Market Coverage Case without Tying)   1
For   1; the price in market A is zero and all consumers enjoy the service without
tying, which is an e¢ cient outcome. The equilibrium in market B is also e¢ cient without
tying because all consumers use the more e¢ cient service provided by rm 2. Therefore,
tying can only reduce social welfare. From Proposition 4, we know that for   1, rm 1
has incentives to engage in tying only for the parameter values such that the post-tying
equilibrium prices are characterized by eP  = 0; ep2 = 0 (see Figure 2). In this case, there
are two sources of ine¢ ciencies. First, any consumer whose valuation in market A is less
than  purchases from rm 2 and consumes only product B. Second, consumers whose
valuation in market A is more than  ine¢ ciently switch from rm 2s more e¢ cient
product to the bundled product. Note that consumer surplus increases in this case due to
a decrease in the price of rm 2s product from  to zero. Consumers whose valuation in
market A is more than  (u > ) are indi¤erent between the two regimes, but low type
consumers in market A (whose u < ) gain with tying because their utility is v2 with
tying while it was u+ v1 without tying.
Case 2. (Partial Market Coverage Case without Tying)  < 1
When  < 1; the price in market A is positive without tying and the market outcome
is ine¢ cient whereas the market outcome in B is e¢ cient. As in the previous case, tying
can introduce ine¢ ciency in market B when rm 1 ine¢ ciently serves consumers with a
bundled product, but there can be a positive market expansion e¤ect in market A as the
bundle price is reduced. As a result, social welfare can be ambiguous. However, for social
welfare to increase with tying a necessary condition is that market A expands with tying.
The next lemma derives the condition under which market A expands with tying.
Lemma 6. Market A expands with tying if and only if  < 1  2:
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Figure 2: Incentives to Tie in Two-Sided Markets
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The immediate corollary of lemma 6 is that tying decreases social welfare if  > 1 2:
Now let us consider the case where  < 1   2 and hence market A expands with
tying. More generally, the social welfare change with tying (W ) in this case can be
written as
W =
Z 1 
2
1  eD1(u+ )du| {z }
Welfare Gain in Market A
due to Market Expansion
  eD1|{z}
Social Welfare Loss in Market B
;
where eD1 denotes the demand for the bundle after tying. After analyzing the welfare
e¤ects of tying depending on the equilibrium price congurations (see the proof of Propo-
sition 5), we nd that tying increases welfare for small enough as in this case the welfare
loss in market B is small.
Proposition 5. Tying is welfare-reducing if  > 1   2 since market A contracts and
there is ine¢ cient switching in market B. If  < 1   2; market A expands and tying
can enhance welfare if  is su¢ ciently small since ine¢ ciency associated with tying in
market B becomes arbitrary small as ! 0:
5 Heterogenous consumers with intergroup network e¤ects
Up to now, we assumed two-sided markets in which the consumer side serves as a compet-
itive bottleneck but did not derive any direct utilities (or disutilities) from the other side
which can be considered as advertisers. This was to capture the advertising revenue-based
business model of many Internet platform markets such as Google. In this section, we ex-
tend our analysis by explicitly considering intergroup network e¤ects from the other side
to consumers. For instance, we can interpret the other side as app producers or content
providers. In the presence of network e¤ects, consumers choices can exhibit strategic
complementarity and coordination plays an important role. In such a situation, tying can
be used as a strategic instrument to help consumers coordinate and coalesce around the
bundled product. We investigate how the presence of network e¤ects a¤ects the previous
results on the relationship between the incentive to tie and  (and ).
For simplicity, we assume that the monopolistic platform market A is the same as in
Section 4. We modify market B as follows. Let pci be the price charged by platform i on
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the consumer side in market B. Then, a consumer subscribing to platform i in market B
derives a utility of
vi + cn
a
i   pci ;
where c(> 0) is a parameter representing intergroup network e¤ects and n
a
i is the mea-
sure of applications/content available at platform i. We assume   v2  v1 > 0. On
the application side, let pai be the price an application developer needs to pay to have
access to consumers on platform i. An application developers payo¤ from developing an
application or creating content for platform i is
an
c
i   pai ;
where a > 0 and n
c
i is the measure of consumers on platform i. Marginal costs of serving
consumers are once again assumed to be zero.
We consider the following sequential game.
1. Each rm (i.e., platform) sets the prices for consumers.
2. Consumers make purchase or subscription decisions
3. (After observing consumer choices at stage 2), each platform chooses the price for
application developers
4. (After observing consumer choices at stage 2 and price choices at stage 3), applica-
tion developers choose subscription decisions.
Stages 1 and 2 of this sequential game are identical to the games we studied in the
previous sections. The main di¤erence is that the advertising revenue per consumer in
market B was exogenously given in the previous sections whereas its equivalent is now
endogenous: solving for Stages 3 and 4 allows us to compute the additional prot that
a platform can obtain from the application side by attracting one more consumer. We
assume that consumers single home while application developers can multihome. As usual,
we analyze the game by using backward induction.
5.1 Equilibrium on the Application Side
Suppose that platform i has nic measure of consumers on board. Let us study the game
that starts at stage 4.
In order to endogenously derive the number of applications available, we assume that
each developer incurs a platform-specic xed cost f . The xed cost is distributed over
the positive line with density equal to one. Given the heterogeneity in the xed cost
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of development, an application developer will subscribe to platform i if the following
condition holds:
an
c
i   pai  f:
Hence, given nci and p
a
i , the total measure of app developers who subscribe to platform i
is
nai (p
a
i ;n
c
i) = an
c
i   pai :
Therefore, at stage 3 with nai determined in the previous stage, platform i solves the
following problem.
max
pai
pai n
a
i (p
a
i ;n
c
i) = p
a
i (an
c
i   pai ):
From the rst-order condition for platform is prot maximization, platform i chooses
pai =
an
c
i
2
:
The measure of app developers who subscribe to platform i also is given by nai =
an
c
i
2
with
a uniform distribution of f with density one. As a result, given the number of consumers
nci ; platform is prot on the application side is
ai (n
c
i) =

an
c
i
2
2
:
Note that this result does not depend on whether or not there is tying on the consumer
side.
5.2 Equilibrium on the Consumer Side
We now analyze the e¤ects of tying on the consumer side.
5.2.1 No Tying
Consider platform competition at stage 1 without tying. As we assume that all consumers
are homogenous in market B, there can potentially be multiple equilibria for some price
congurations due to positive intergroup network e¤ects. In such cases, we assume that
all identical consumers coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium.45
45This is a standard equilibrium selection criterion in the presence of multiple equilibria with network
e¤ects. See, for instance, Katz and Shaprio (1986) and Waldman (1993).
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Hence, if pc2 < p
c
1+, all consumers coordinate on platform 2 as long as their individual
rationality constraint is satised. Therefore, in equilibrium, we have pc1 = 0; p
c
2 =  and
all consumers join the more e¢ cient platform 2, that is, nc1 = 0 and n
c
2 = 1. In this
tipping equilibrium with nc2 = 1, rm 2 charges p
a
2 =
an
c
2
2
= a
2
on the application side
and induces a measure of na2 =
a
2
application developers to be on its platform. Thus,
each consumers payo¤ on platform 2 is
v2 + cn
a
2   pc2 = v2 + c

a
2

  = v1 + ;
where   ca
2
represents the network benets in the tipping equilibrium. As in the
analysis of the previous section, each consumer receives a surplus of v1 due to platform
competition on the consumer side. In addition, each consumer receives additional benet
of  = ca
2
from intergroup network e¤ects.
5.2.2 Tying
Now consider the equilibrium in the tying regime in which platform 1 ties its monopolized
product A with another product in competitive two-sided market B, and charges eP for
the bundled product. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. (stability) ca < 1,  < 1=2
Without this assumption, there cannot exist any interior equilibrium in which both
platforms share the market in our two-sided market. This is because the feedback mech-
anism due to intergroup network e¤ects magnies any initial advantage of one platform
and leads to exploding demands.
We further assume that  < 1=2 for tying to have a leverage e¤ect in the tied good
market. If  is too large (i.e.,  > 1=2), the disadvantage of rm 1 vis-à-vis rm 2 is
too large to overcome in the tied good market; tying has no leverage e¤ect. Note that
 < 1=2 along with the stability assumption implies that purchasing the bundle is the
dominant strategy for the highest consumer type in market A (whose u = 1) if the bundle
is o¤ered for free. For this type of consumer, the valuation of product A is so high that
the bundled product is preferred even if all other consumers purchase stand-alone product
B2 and there are no application developers for B1.
Therefore, in what follows, by using iterated elimination of dominated strategies, we
study a cut-o¤ equilibrium: we consider a u 2 [0; 1] such that all consumers whose
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valuation from the monopoly product is higher than u join platform 1 while all the
rest join platform 2, which implies that nc1 = 1   u; nc2 = u on the consumer side and
na1 =
a
2
(1  u); na2 = a2 u:
Let eP and ep2 be the bundle price by rm 1 and rm 2s price for product B2 in the
tying regime, respectively. In the (interior) cut-o¤equilibrium, u is implicitly determined
as follows:
[u + v1] + (1  u)  eP = v2 + u   ep2: (3)
The LHS of (3) represents type u consumers utility when he purchases the bundled
product whereas the RHS of (3) represents type u consumers utility when he purchases
only product B supplied by rm 2. The critical type u is indi¤erent between these two
options. Hence,
nc2( eP ; ep2) = u =
(
+ eP ep2 
(1 ca) ; if
eP > ep2 +   ;
0; if eP  ep2 +   :
The expression for nc2 above reveals new e¤ects of tying in the presence of intergroup
network e¤ects. If there are no network e¤ects (i.e., ca = 0), rm 2 can always
guarantee a positive market share unless its price does not exceed the bundle price by
. For instance, if rm 2 charges a price of zero, rm 2 will always have some positive
market share (nc2 > 0). However, because of the existence of network externalities (i.e., as
the number of consumers who choose platform 1 increases, the applications available on
that platform increases), tying can create an advantage for platform 1 if tying provides
a mechanism for rm 1 to capture more consumers than rm 2. As the network e¤ects
term (ca) increases, rm 2s market share decreases down to zero and eventually tying
leads to the foreclosure of rm 2 in the market. Note that @n
c
2
@ eP =
@nc2@ep2  = 11 ca > 1 is
a multiplier in the two-sided market. It shows that the demand changes more sensitively
to price as ca increases.
Consider the case where nc2( eP ; ep2) > 0. Then, we can decompose the market share of
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the tying rm into two terms as follows:
nc1( eP ; ep2) = 1 nc2( eP ; ep2) = 1  h( eP   ep2) + i| {z }
Demand in the Absence of
Intergroup Network E¤ects
+
ca
(1  ca)

1
2
 
h
( eP   ep2) + i| {z }
Induced Demand Due to
Intergroup Network E¤ects
;
(4)
where 1 
h
( eP   ep2) + i is a hypothetical demand for rm 1 in the absence of intergroup
network e¤ects (i.e., ca = 0), which we have seen in Section 4 (see equation (2)).
In order to understand equilibrium pricing, it is useful to decipher the economic
meaning of 	  1   ca   (a)
2
2
. As rm 1s prot under tying is given by e1 =h eP + + (a)2nc1
4
i
nc1, its rst-order condition for prot maximization is given by:
@e1
@ eP = @n
c
1
@ eP
h eP +   nc1	i = 0;
where @n
c
1
@ eP =   11 ca . We can rewrite the condition above in a modied Lerner index
form: eP + eP = n
c
1	eP :
If the tying rm did not take into account the e¤ect of its bundle pricing decision on
the prot from the application side, 	 would not contain the term (a)
2
2
and we would
have 	 = 1   ca, which is equal to the inverse of
@nc1
@ eP
. Therefore, we can state the
rst-order condition as the standard Lerner formula with the interpretation of ( ) as the
opportunity cost of the bundle. 	 corrects the standard formula by taking into account
the fact that an increase in market share increases the prot from the application market
through the network e¤ects. If this e¤ect is large such that 	  0, rm 1 nds it optimal
to choose eP = 0 for any   0. The same remark applies to rm 2. Therefore,  	 can be
considered a measure of degree of competition induced by intergroup network e¤ects, which
increases with the network e¤ects and the prot per consumer from the app market.
We can have two types of equilibria: an interior equilibrium in which rm 1 and rm 2
share the market with nc2 > 0 and the tipping equilibrium in which the tying rm captures
the whole market with nc2 = 0.
46 The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium
46With the maintained assumption of  < 1=2 and the stability assumption, there is no tipping
equilibrium in which rm 2 captures the whole market.
40
conditions.
Proposition 6. We have a tipping equilibrium (with nc1 = 1 and n
c
2 = 0) if    and
  b  (   ) + 	, where 	 = 1   ca   (a)22 : Otherwise, we have an interior
equilibrium with both nc1 > 0 and n
c
2 > 0:
In the appendix, we not only prove the proposition above but also further characterize
equilibrium prices in each type of equilibrium. Proposition 6 shows that if  > ,
that is, the quality advantage of rm 2 is su¢ ciently large compared to the strength of
network e¤ects, we always have an interior equilibrium. However, if the network e¤ects
are relatively stronger than the quality advantage of rm 2 (i.e.,  < ), tying can be
a mechanism for rm 1 to leverage its market power in A to B and lead to foreclosure
of the rival rm. Note that the condition for tipping is more likely to be satised as 
increases. For instance, if  > 1, we always have a tipping equilibrium as long as  < :
5.3 Incentives to Tie with Intergroup Network E¤ects
We now analyze incentives to tie in the presence of intergroup network e¤ects. Proposition
6 shows that when    holds, a tipping equilibrium is more likely as  increases. This
is because a high  induces the monopolist to price more aggressively in the consumer
market, providing more surplus to inframarginal consumers, which can be leveraged to
attract all consumers in market B through network e¤ects (see the demand decomposition
in (4)). If tipping occurs, rm 1 captures all advertising revenue in market A, which breaks
the result obtained in the previous section that there exists a critical value of  such that
tying is not protable if   .
5.3.1 Tipping Equilibrium
As shown in Proposition 6, we have a tipping equilibrium if    and   1  [(ca +
(a)
2
2
)+( )]: In the tipping equilibrium, p = 0, P  =  . Thus, rm 1s prot with
tying is e1 = +a2 2+( ) while its prot without tying is 1 =max14(1 + )2; 	 :
When   1, rm 1 serves all consumers in the tying market regardless of tying. Therefore,
tying is protable as it increases the prot from the tying market from  to  +    
and generates the prot from the apps. By continuity, tying is protable for  close to
one and we have the following result.
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Proposition 7. When the tipping equilibrium prevails under tying, rm 1 has incentives
to tie if  >   1 
q
(a)
2 + 4(  ):
Proof. When   1, rm 1s prot without tying is : Since ca
2
  in the tipping
equilibrium, it immediately follows that tying is protable when   1: For  < 1, rm
1s prot under tying is 1
4
(1 + )2: A simple comparison of rm 1s prots under each
regime yields the result.
The proposition indicates that tying is more likely to be protable for  high, c high
and a high. Propositions 6 and 7, taken together, yield the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. If    and  > max[b; ] (where max[b; ] < 1), rm 1 engages in
tying and the resulting equilibrium is a tipping equilibrium in which rm 2 is foreclosed
from the market.
We point out the di¤erence the introduction of intergroup network e¤ects creates with
respect to the result in the previous section. In section 4, for a given ; tying becomes
unprotable at some point as  increases. The reason is that without network e¤ects,
the rival rm can always induce some marginal consumers in market A to buy product
B when tying takes place. As a result, tying entails greater loss as  increases. However,
this e¤ect can disappear in the model with intergroup network e¤ects if tying induces a
tipping equilibrium, which is more likely when  is high.
5.3.2 Interior Equilibrium
Due to the conicting e¤ects of , the e¤ects of tying on the tying rms prots can be
subtle in the interior equilibrium. As explained earlier, a higher  induces the tying rm to
price more aggressively in the consumer market, providing more surplus to inframarginal
consumers of A, which can be used to compete against rm 2 in market B when tying
takes place. In the interior equilibrium, however, capturing a certain share of market B
comes at the expense of the share of market A, which can be very costly when  is very
high. We thus can show that tying cannot be a protable strategy if  is su¢ ciently large
as in Section 4.
In the case of an interior equilibrium, let us focus on the case in which eP  = 0. This
holds either if 	 < 0 and  <  (see Lemma 7(ii) in Appendix) or if 	  0 but nc1 	 is
bounded above by  (i.e. (6) is satised) (see Lemma 9(i) in Appendix). In both cases,
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rm 1s market share under tying is independent of  and is given by
nc1 =
(
1   
(1 ) if 	 < 0;
1   
	+(1 ) if 	  0.
Dene the di¤erence between rm 1s prot under tying and rm 1s prot without tying
as follows
() 
(
nc1 (+
(a)
2
4
nc1 ) 
 
1+
2
2
; if  2 [0; 1] ;
nc1 (+
(a)
2
4
nc1 )  , if  > 1:
Suppose that nc1 is close enough to one that(1) > 0. Note rst that() is concave
for  2 [0; 1]. For  > 1, as () linearly decreases, there exists  = (a)2
4
nc1 =(1  nc1 )
at which() = 0. We below distinguish the case of(0)  0 from(0) < 0. Sup-
pose (0)  0. Then, tying is strictly protable for any  2 (0; ). If (0) < 0, there
exists some 2 (0; 1) at which () = 0. Hence, tying is protable for any  2 (; ).
As  tends to 1 when nc1 goes to one, the result obtained when (0) < 0 extends the
result on the incentive to tie in the tipping equilibrium, described in Proposition 7, to an
interior market share.
5.4 Welfare Analysis
We now analyze welfare implications of tying. First consider the case where tying leads
to tipping. If  > 1, all consumers in market A were served before tying. There is
thus no market expansion e¤ect in this case. The only e¤ect is that consumers switch
from rm 2s product to rm 1s product, which is inferior. Thus, tying unambiguously
reduces welfare in this case, with the welfare loss being : If  < 1, but tying induces
tipping, there is a positive market expansion e¤ect in market A. The welfare gain from
this market expansion can be expressed as
E =
Z 1 
2
0
udu+

1  
2

 =
(1 + 3)(1  )
8
This welfare gain needs to be measured against the loss in welfare in market B, which
is : Tying can be welfare reducing if E < : E is highest at 1=6 when  = 1=3:
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition that tying reduces welfare is  > 1=6 if tying induces
tipping towards the bundled product.
If tying does not lead to tipping, there is an additional type of welfare loss due to a
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fragmented market structure which does not fully exploit network benets.
We can also analyze the e¤ects of tying on consumer surplus. For instance, suppose
that  > 1 and tying leads to tipping. If eP  = 0, consumers are indi¤erent between
tying and no tying. However, if eP  > 0, consumers lose from tying. Without tying, each
consumer enjoys (a)
2
2
of surplus from rm 2 in market B because of price competition in
market B. Tying removes the level playing eld and allows the tying rm to extract the
surplus from network e¤ects.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. The
basic premise of our theory is that the optimal pricing and competition strategies in a
two-sided market often lead to below-cost pricing on one side of the market whose loss
is often recouped on the other side. When the below-cost pricing is constrained by the
non-negative price constraint, competition is relaxed and supra-competitive prots can be
created. A monopolist in another market can extract this surplus via a tying arrangement
which e¤ectively allows the tying rm to engage in negative pricing. Furthermore, as the
competing rm in the tied two-sided market is constrained by non-negative pricing, its
response to tying cannot be so aggressive, which in turn makes tying even more protable.
We also demonstrated that this mechanism can also be applied to other market contexts
such as dynamic competition with direct network e¤ects and switching costs.
Our analysis has focused on the e¤ects of tying on short-run price competition and their
implications on consumer surplus and welfare. In our baseline model with homogenous
consumers, for instance, tying is welfare-reducing because it induces ine¢ cient switching
to the inferior product of the tying rm in the tied market. Nonetheless, consumers are
not worse o¤because they are compensated for the consumption of the inferior product by
the tying rm. However, if we consider rival rmsincentives to develop new products in
the tied market, we may nd further harm in consumer welfare because more innovative
products may not be introduced by the rival rms due to the lack of market access.
However, we also point out that there could be many e¢ cient reasons to engage in tying
such as integration of di¤erent apps which enables the tying rm to provide better and
seamless services to consumers. Antitrust investigations should weigh these potential
e¢ ciencies against the potential harm identied in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
We show that no rm has incentives to deviate at the putative equilibrium prices ofeP = u    and ep2 = 0. When consumers are indi¤erent between buying the bundle
only and buying rm 2s product only, we break the tie in favor of the bundle to avoid
the open set problem: this is because rm 1 can decrease its price by " > 0; but rm 2
cannot because it is constrained by non-negative pricing. At these prices, a consumers
payo¤ is v2 if he single-homes and buys only the bundle while his payo¤ is v2 + m if
he multihomes. Therefore, only those consumers with m   multihome in equilibrium.
Consider rst the deviation of rm 2 to ep2 > 0. A deviation to ep2 >  is obviously
not optimal as rm 2 would have no demand. If ep2  , the marginal consumer type
who is indi¤erent between multihoming and not is given by m =    ep2 . With this
deviation, rm 2s prot is given by
2(ep2; eP = u ) = (ep2 + )G(  ep2):
The rst-order derivative is
@2
@ep2 = G(  ep2)  (ep2 + ) g(  ep2)  0;
when it is evaluated at ep2 = 0 with the assumption of G()=g()  : The log-concavity
of g guarantees that @2
@ep2 < 0 when evaluated at all positive ep2. Therefore, there is no
protable deviation for rm 2.
Consider now a deviation by rm 1. Its equilibrium prot from eP = u  is (u )+
[1 G ()] . It has no incentive to decrease its price from the equilibrium price since it
sells the bundle to all consumers. Consider a deviation to eP > u . Then, all consumers
prefer buying rm 2s product to buying the bundle. If a consumer multi-homes and also
buys the bundle, his payo¤ increases by (u   eP  m). Therefore, only consumers whose
cost of multi-homing is less than (u  eP ) multi-home. Firm 1s prot upon the deviation
is ePG(u  eP ), which cannot be larger than the prot under no tying, u. Hence, if rm 1
has an incentive to tie, such deviation is never protable. Firm 1 has incentives to tie ife1 = (u ) + [1 G ()]   u = 1, that is, if [1 G ()]  > :
Proof of Lemma 1
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(i) If eP 2 [ep2  ; 1 + ep2  ], rm 1s prot is
1( eP ; ep2) = (1  [( eP   ep2) + ])( eP + + )
The rst-order condition with respect to eP is equivalent to
eP = (1 )  (+ ) + ep2
2
:
For this to be the optimal, the condition eP = (1 ) (+)+ep2
2
 maxf0; ep2  g needs to
be satised.
When 0  eP < ep2  , rm 1s prot is
1( eP ; ep2) = ( eP + + )
Hence, it is optimal to choose eP = maxf0; ep2 g given the non-negative price constraint.
Therefore, the best response is eP = (1 ) (+)+ep2
2
for  + [1  (+ )]  ep2 >
   [1  (+ )]. If 1   +  or for ep2 =2 [ + [1  (+ )] ;   [1  (+ )], it is
optimal to choose eP = maxf0; ep2  g.
(ii) Firm 2s prot is zero if 0  eP < ep2  : If eP  ep2  , its prot is
2( eP ; ep2) = [( eP   ep2) + ](ep2 + ):
The rst-order condition with respect to ep2 yields
[( eP   ep2) + ]  (ep2 + ) = 0;
which can be rewritten as ep2 = (  ) + eP
2
:
For this to be the optimal, the condition for ep2 = ( )+ eP2  eP + needs to be satised,
i.e., eP   ( + );which holds always. We can thus write the best response of rm 2 as
BR2( eP ) = max[(  ) + eP
2
; 0]
Proof of Lemma 2
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It is omitted as it is straightforward from the explanations in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 3
In this case, it can be easily shown that eP  > ep2: Thus, the non-negative price
constraint is binding rst for the rival rms price under tying. We thus have
eP  = (1 )  (+ )
2
; ep2 = 0:
Firm 1 and rm 2s demands are respectively given by
eD1 = (1 ) + (+ )
2
; ed2 = (1 + )  (+ )
2
:
The corresponding prots are given by
e1 = (1 ) + (+ )
2
2
; e2 =  (1 + )  (+ )
2

:
Since  < 1 2 in the case we consider, rm 1s prot under no tying is 1 =
 
1+
2
2
:
Since  >  in this case, we have e1 > 1, that is, tying is protable for the tying rm.
In contrast, tying reduces the rival rms prot. To see this, note that the rival rms
prot in the absence of tying is 2 =  +  >  > 
h
(1+) (+)
2
i
= e2 because
(1 + )  (+ ) < 2 as  > :
Proof of Lemma 4
It is omitted as the proof of (i) and (ii) is provided in the main text and the proof of
(iii) is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 5
In this case, it can easily be shown that eP  < ep2: Thus, the non-negative price
constraint is binding rst for the tying rm We thus have
eP  = 0; ep2 =   2 :
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Firm 1 and rm 2s demands are respectively given by
eD1 = 1  + 
2
; ed2 = + 
2
:
The corresponding prots are given by
e1 = (+ ) 1  + 
2

; e2 = + 
2
2
:
We need to show that
e1 = (+ ) 1  + 
2

<
(  
1+
2
2
if  < 1
 if  > 1
For  < 1;we use the following fact
x+ y
2
2
 xy for any x and y:
Let x = +  and y = 1  +
2
: Then, we have
(+ )

1  + 
2

<

2 + 2+   
4
2
:
Since  <  in this case, we have
 
2+2+ 
4
2
<
 
1+
2
2
: Therefore, e1 = ( +
)

1  +
2

<
 
1+
2
2
= 1 if  < 1:
For  > 1; tying is protable only when (+)

1  +
2

> : This condition can be
rewritten as
 <
2
+ 
  :
Since  < , the condition above can be satised only when  < 2
+
 , or (+) < 1;
which is impossible because  > 1: Therefore, tying cannot be protable for  > 1, either.
Tying obviously hurts rm 2 as tying reduces its price and market share.
Proof of Lemma 6
In market A, all consumers whose valuations satisfy u  1 
2
purchase product A.
With tying, all consumers whose valuations satisfy u  (1   eD1) consume product A,
where eD1 denotes the bundle demand for rm 1. Thus, for market A to expand we need
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1 
2
> (1  eD1): We can easily verify that this condition is equivalent to  < 1   2 by
checking all possible equilibrium price congurations with tying.
Proof of Proposition 5
 eP  = 0; ep2 = 0
Consider a situation in which the post-tying equilibrium prices are zero ( eP  = 0; ep2 =
0): Because eD1 = 1   in this case, the social welfare change with tying (W ) can be
written as
W =
Z 1 
2

(u+ )du  (1 )
We can easily see that if  is su¢ ciently small, then social welfare loss in market B
from tying is negligible. Thus, if  is su¢ ciently large, rm 1 has incentives to capture
market B with tying, and tying can be socially benecial as the market expansion e¤ects
in market A outweigh social welfare loss in market B.47
Consumer welfare in this case always increases because now both goods are provided
for free.
 eP  > 0; ep2 = 0
In this case, eD1 = (1 )+(+)2 : By proceeding in a similar way as above, we can verify
that if  is su¢ ciently small, tying can increase welfare. Otherwise, tying decreases
welfare. It can also be shown that market A always expands with tying as 1 
2
> 1  eD1
in this case.
Concerning consumer welfare, we can easily verify that eP  = (1 ) (+)
2
< pm = 1 
2
,
i.e., the bundled product is even cheaper than the stand-alone A product price before
tying. As a result, consumers benet from tying.
 eP  > 0; ep2 > 0
In this case, eD1 = 2+ 3 : Once again, if  is su¢ ciently small, tying can increase
welfare. Otherwise, tying decreases welfare.
Proof of Proposition 6
47We can also show that if  > 1=7, tying reduces welfare regardless of the value of :
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To derive the equilibrium prices under tying, note that rm 1s and rm 2s total
prots are respectively given by
e1( eP ; nc1( eP ; ep2)) = ( eP + )nc1 + anc12
2
| {z }
Prot from the App Side
;
e2(ep2; nc2( eP ; ep2)) = ep2nc2 + anc22
2
Firm 1s rst-order condition for prot maximization is given by
@e1
@ eP = nc1 +
" eP + + (a)2 nc1
2
#
@nc1
@ eP
=   1
1  ca
" eP +   nc1(1  ca   (a)22 )
#
where @n
c
1
@ eP =   11 ca (=  @n
c
2
@ eP ): Using 	  1 ca  (a)22 , we can rewrite the expression
above as
@e1
@ eP =   11  ca
h eP +   nc1	i :
If 	 < 0, we always have @e1
@ eP < 0, implying that eP = 0 is optimal in the interior
equilibrium where nc2 > 0. In a tipping equilibrium with foreclosure where n
c
2 = 0, there
is no market share to gain and hence it is not optimal to reduce the price further and we
will have eP = ep+ (  ).
Similarly, rm 2s rst-order condition for prot maximization is given by
@e2ep2 = nc2 +
"ep2 + (a)2 nc2
2
#
@nc2ep2
=   1
1  ca
[ep2   nc2	]
where @n
c
2
@ep2 =   11 ca . Once again, if 	 < 0, we have @e2ep2 < 0, implying that ep2 = 0 is
optimal.
Note that the second-order derivatives for rm 1 and rm 2 are the same and given
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by:
@2e1
@ eP 2 = @
2e2
@ep22 =   11  ca  
"
1  (a)
2
2
1
1  ca
#
1
1  ca
:
They are negative if
(a)
2 < 4 (1  ca) ;
which is equivalent to
ca +
1
4
(a)
2 < 1:
We consider two cases depending on the magnitudes of intergroup externality para-
meters (i.e., the sign of 	).
Case 1. 	 < 0 (i.e., ca +
(a)
2
2
> 1)
In this case, the equilibrium prices are ep2 = 0 and eP  = max f0;   g as @e2ep2 < 0: We
can have two types of equilibria depending on the relative magnitude of  and: a tipping
equilibrium or an interior equilibrium. We have the following lemma that characterizes
equilibrium in this case.
Lemma 7. Suppose that 	 < 0: Then, we have ep2 = 0.
(i) If  > ; we have a tipping equilibrium in which nc2 = 0 and eP  > 0.
(ii) If  < , we have an interior equilibrium with nc2 > 0 and both prices being driven
down to zero ( eP  = ep2 = 0), where
nc2 =
  
(1  ca)
> 0;
nc1 = 1  nc2 =
1  ( + )
(1  ca)
> 0:
Case 2. 	  0 (i.e., ca + (a)
2
2
 1)
We also consider two types of equilibria under tying in this case: a tipping equilibrium
and an interior equilibrium. Note that in this case (i.e., when 	  0); the second-order
condition is always satised in each rms maximization problem.
Tipping Let us rst analyze the possibility of a tipping equilibrium. In a tipping
equilibrium with nc2 = 0; we have the following rst-order condition for rm 2:
@e2ep2 =   ep21  ca  0:
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Hence, ep2 = 0. Then, the highest eP consistent with tipping is eP  = max f0;   g.
At this price, rm 1 must have no incentive to deviate; the rst-order derivative must be
zero or negative.
If  < ; the equilibrium prices in a tipping equilibrium need to be eP  = ep2 = 0:
However, at these prices rm 2 has a strictly positive market share. We thus have a
contradiction and there cannot be a tipping equilibrium if  < :
If   ; then eP  =    and the following condition must hold:
@e1eP =   11  ca [  +  	]  0;
which is equivalent to
  (  ) + 	:
Summarizing, we have:
Lemma 8. Suppose that 	  0. There is a tipping equilibrium in which eP  =    
p = 0 if    and   (  ) + 	, where 	 = 1  ca   (a)
2
2
:
Interior Equilibrium Let us look for an interior equilibrium (i.e., each rm has a
positive market share): 0 < nc2 < 1. For an interior equilibrium, rm 2s rst-order
condition for prot maximization is given by
ep2 = nc2 	 > 0: (5)
However, eP  can be zero. From rm 1s rst-order condition, we have:
eP  = max f0; + nc1 	g :
Consider the case of eP  = 0: Then, from the demand function and (5), we have
nc2 =
(  )  nc2 	
(1  ca)
By collecting terms in nc2 , we have
nc2 =
  
	+ (1  ca)
:
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eP  = 0 is an equilibrium price for rm 1 if
nc1 	  ;
which is equivalent to 
1    
	+ (1  ca)

	  : (6)
If (6) is violated, then eP  =  + nc1 	 > 0:
Then, eP    ep2 = (1  2nc2 )	  :
Putting this into the market share equation leads to
nc2 (1  ca) = (  ) + (1  2nc2 )	  ;
which can be rewritten as
nc2
"
3	 +
(a)
2
2
#
= (  )  +	:
Therefore,
nc2 =
(  )  +	
3
h
	+ (a)
2
6
i
=
3
2
h
	+ (a)
2
6
i
  1
2
+  
3
h
	+ (a)
2
6
i
=
1
2
  1 + 2  2
6	 + (a)
2
Hence, rm 1s market share is
nc1 = 1  nc2 =
1
2
+
1 + 2  2
6	 + (a)
2 :
Because we assume 	 = 1   ca   (a)
2
2
> 0, the denominator in the market share
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expression is strictly positive. Under the maintained assumption of  < 1=2, rm 1s
market share is larger than 1=2, which is the market size in the monopolized market
A without tying when it is one-sided (i.e., when  = 0). The market share for rm 1
increases with  and decreases with , as expected. The market shares response to  or
 is greater as the intergroup externalities in market B becomes more important (i.e., as
c or a increases).
Firm 1s equilibrium price is
eP  =  + nc1 	  0:
=  + 	
2
+
(1 + 2  2)	
6	 + (a)
2 :
We nd
@ eP 
@
=  1 + 2	
6	 + (a)
2
2
=  4	 + (a)
2
6	 + (a)
2 < 0:
@ eP 
@
< 0:
@ eP 
@c
= nc1
@	
@c
+	  @n
c
1
@c
=  a

1
2
+
1 + 2  2
6	 + (a)
2

+	  a
1 + 2  2
6
h
	+ (a)
2
6
i2
=  a
241
2
+
1 + 2  2
6
h
	+ (a)
2
6
i "1  	
	+ (a)
2
6
#35 < 0:
Firm 2s equilibrium price is
ep2 = nc2 	
=

1
2
  1 + 2  2
6	 + (a)
2

	:
For a given market share, ca > 0 induces rm 2 to charge a lower price to consumers
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for product B than when ca = 0. In addition, as long as 1 + 2   2 > 0, rm 2s
market share is smaller when ca > 0 than when ca = 0. Hence, both factors would
induce rm 2 to become more aggressive.
Summarizing, we have:
Lemma 9. Suppose that 	  0 and the conditions for the tipping equilibrium in Lemma
8 are not met. Then, there is an interior equilibrium such that
(i) if (6) is satised, eP  = 0, ep2 = nc2 	 > 0 and
nc2 =
  
2	 + (a)
2
2
:
(ii) if (6) is violated, eP  =  + (1  nc2 )	 > 0; ep2 = nc2 	 > 0 and
nc2 =
1
2
  1 + 2  2
6	 + (a)
2
All the results in lemmas 7-9 we derived under di¤erent parameter congurations can
be summarized as in Proposition 6.
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